Introduction
Holland Smith's relief of Ralph Smith from command during the battle for Saipan ignited a slow burning fuse of service competition, jealousy, and animosity that some historians, politicians, and service members say is still burning bright today. If not for the sheer determination of the highest Army, Marine
Corps, and Navy commanders in Washington, something so trivial, yet historic, would have hindered the strategic goals and operational objectives of the war against the Japanese. In the months and years that followed victory on the two fronts of the Second World War, talk and speculation continued to swirl 
Army Version
Holland Smith's actions and his justification for the relief outraged the Army's senior leadership and supporters. Whether the relief of Major General Ralph Smith brought about any significant change one way or the other in the fighting spirit of his division is purely speculative. However, there is no doubt that the relief of an Army general by a Marine general fueled an interservice controversy "of alarming proportions--a controversy that seriously jeopardized harmonious relations at all levels among the Army and the Navy and the Marine Corps in the Pacific." 4 Army officers were quick to defend their service in the immediate aftermath of Ralph Smith's relief. By the end of the battle for Saipan, relationships between Army officers and Marine officers on Lieutenant General Smith's corps staff had reached their breaking point. Several high ranking Army staff officers reported that the Marine officers made little effort to hide their opinion that the 27th Infantry Division was an inferior organization relative to 2d
Marine Division's and 4th Marine Division's performances in battle. 5 According to Army historians, the first indications of tension between the two services appeared ironically enough just prior to the landing on Saipan, where soldiers and Marines still had to fight shoulder to shoulder for more than three weeks to capture the island.
The tension between the two services continued to grow as numerous Army officers continued to voice their disdain for the Marine Corps. 6 The openly hostile reaction of several senior ranking Army officers present on Saipan culminated with a determination never to serve again under Lieutenant General Holland Smith. Just five days before the conclusion of the battle, Lieutenant General Richardson appointed a board of inquiry to examine the facts regarding Major General Smith's relief. Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner was its chair, and it consisted of four other senior Army officers: Major General John R.
5 Ibid., 193. 6 Harold J. Goldberg, D-Day and virtually no effect on the unit except for the individual officers involved in the matter. The relief of Major General Smith in the midst of the battle for Saipan did result in a firestorm far out of proportion to its significance and did adversely affect the unit. 41 The 27th Infantry Division was virtually demoralized and rendered nearly combat ineffective by the relief of its commander. 42 Interservice bickering reached a point where General George C. Marshall in Washington was forced to issue orders stating that there would be no further discussion regarding Major General Smith's relief. 43 General Marshall, the equivalent of today's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, believed the interservice tension over the matter endangered the war effort in the Pacific theater. In spite of the interservice tension, the American forces did prevail on 38 Ibid., 4-2. 39 Ibid. 40 Love, "Smith versus Smith," 3.
41 Robert Sherrod, "The Saipan Controversy," Infantry Journal (January 1949), 15. 42 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 413. 43 Love, "Smith versus Smith," 3.
Saipan and eventually defeated the Japanese military in the Pacific theater. 44 For his part as the corps commander during the battle for Saipan, Lieutenant General Holland Smith did effectively apply most elements of combat power. However, he was less effective in assessing the elements of military intelligence, mission command, and leadership resulting in the questionable relief of one of his division commanders. These three elements of combat power will form the basis for evaluating some of the factors leading to Ralph Smith's relief.
Intelligence Assessment
After twenty-four hours of fierce fighting following the first amphibious assault wave landing, weary Marines finally tried to get some sleep just a few hundred meters from the shore break. Two things became very clear to the Marines on Saipan: they forced a dangerous beachhead assault into the heart of a bitter enemy firestorm, and a long, tough battle against a very determined foe lay ahead of them. battle. 47 The lack of adequate military intelligence assessment prior to and during the battle for Saipan significantly contributed to the controversial relief of Major General Ralph Smith. 
Underestimated force at Nafutan Point
On 20 June, the 27th Infantry Division launched its first determined attack against the 1200 strong Japanese force consolidated in the center of Nafutan Point, where the enemy had established fortified defensive positions. 50 However, the Army division had not reached the enemy's main line of defense during the first day's movement, and the four battalions from the center of the division's advance 47 Headquarters Expeditionary Troops Task Force 56, G-2 Report On Operation FORAGER, Volume E (31 August 1944), 42. It is important to note that this G-2 Report was written nearly two month after the initial invasion for Saipan. The report is not based on analytical forecasts but on reporting after the campaign had concluded.
48 U.S. Army, Operations, 4-7. 49 The V Amphibious Corps military intelligence staff provided two separate staffs during the battle for Saipan. The main effort and staff for the military intelligence staff was forward deployed with Holland Smith. This staff consisted of six officers and ten enlisted intelligence analyst. An active duty made quick territorial gains. Based on this information, the V Corps' military intelligence staff made an erroneous and dangerous assumption regarding Japanese combat capability within the 27th Infantry Division's sector, especially given the lack of resistance over the previous twenty-four hours of fighting.
51
Division reports filed prior to 1830 on 20 June indicated no enemy resistance. However, between dusk and dawn on 21 June the whole character and intensity of the Army's fight dramatically changed.
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Soldiers in the center American infantry battalion entrenched for the night directly in front of the main Japanese defensive line. Soon after sunset, the enemy counterattacked, and by daybreak, a deadly battle was in progress and every weapon and man in the American centerline was engaged against the attacking Japanese force. By midday, the counterattack force had withdrawn back to its prepared defensive positions, and the 27th Infantry Division resumed its attack in sector. Heavy resistance slowed the division advancement with every yard being contested by the Japanese. 53 The American advance was in stark contrast to the previous day's rapid surge. The heavy Japanese resistance was evidence that there was still plenty of well-organized and armed enemy willing to fight to the very last man. warnings of a lethal Japanese force remaining on Nafutan Point and shifted to the second phase of the campaign, the northern portion of Saipan. 58 This lack of understanding of the operational environment on Nafutan Point became one of the focal points surrounding the confusion regarding the V Corps' orders defining operational control of the 27th Infantry Division rearguard force, which was tasked to defeat the enemy forces on the southeastern portion of Saipan.
Shortly after Ralph Smith's relief and departure from the island, the fighting on Nafutan Point took a bitter turn, just as the relieved Army general had predicted in a letter to the V Corps commander on 23 June. The division commander felt so strongly about the level of risk being accepted on Nafutan Point, that he wrote this letter requesting that the V Corps place the air and services personnel near Aslito
Airfield on full alert. 59 His recommendation would inform the airfield units that infiltration from Nafutan Point through the porous lines of the 27th Infantry Division isolation force was likely to occur in the near future. The sole remaining battalion from the 27th Infantry Division at Nafutan Point had its outnumbered and overextended frontline infiltrated by the remaining Japanese forces during the night of 25 June.
Nearly five hundred Japanese fighters penetrated the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry's perimeter and attacked 55 Mount Nafutan is only four hundred feet above sea level, but it guards the entrance to Nafutan Point's southernmost peninsula. Gordon L Rottman, Saipan and Tinian 1944: 
Mission Command Assessment
The Army describes mission command as the warfighting function that "develops and integrates those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control." 74 The
United States Marine Corps refers to this warfighting function as command and control, which is how the Army formerly classified mission command. This change by the Army is a philosophical shift emphasizing the commander rather than the system for command and control. The previous philosophical approach to this warfighting function did not adequately address the increased requirement for 71 Ibid. 77 "To understand something is to grasp its nature and significance. Commanders continuously develop, test, and update their understanding throughout the conduct of operations. They base effective plans, assessments, decisions, and actions on reasoned, informed, and shared understanding. As commanders develop their understanding, they see patterns emerge, dissipate, and reappear in their operational environment. Recognizing these patterns helps them direct their own forces' actions with respect to other friendly forces, unified action partners, the population, and the enemy." U.S. Army, Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command, 2011 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, September 2011), 2-2.
78 "To visualize is to think in mental images. As commanders begin to develop an understanding of the operational environment, they start visualizing the operation's end state and potential solutions to solve problems. Collectively, this is known as the commander's visualization--the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state. Commanders develop an understanding of the conditions in the operational environment-the current situation. From this understanding, commanders next visualize the operation's end state-the desired future conditions." U.S. Army, Mission Command, 2-3.
79 "To describe is to represent or account for something in words and images. After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates. This description facilitates shared understanding of the situation, mission, and intent. Commanders ensure subordinates understand their
Unclear Mission Orders
Holland Smith wanted to concentrate all of his combat power against the Japanese force on the northern side of the island, but he failed to effectively communicate how Ralph Smith was to employ elements of his division against the enemy remaining on Nafutan Point. The V Corps commander was planning with great care his attack against the northern end of the island, and it was to be his decisive action against the enemy.
81 The orders for the attack were completed and issued before 0900 on 21 June, and a copy of them reached the 27th Infantry Division at noon. 82 After reviewing the order, Major
General Smith realized that his division was to withdraw all its troops, except one battalion from the southern part of the island, and assemble the division near the frontlines with the two Marine divisions. A lone infantry battalion from the division remaining in the south was expected to clear the remaining Japanese forces on Nafutan Point. 83 The problem with this portion of the plan was that Holland Smith, along with his staff, was unaware of the enemy strength and the level of intense fighting still occurring on Nafutan Point.
Acting upon further reports of intense fighting within the 27th Infantry Division's front lines on Nafutan Point, Colonel Albert K. Stebins, the division's chief of staff, called the V Corps operations officer, Colonel J.C. McQueen, at 1430 and advised him that two battalions might be needed for the visualization well enough to begin course of action development. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms whenever possible. They continually refine and clarify it throughout the operations process." Ibid.
80 "To direct is to regulate the course of events. Commanders make decisions and direct action throughout the operations process based on their understanding of the situation. They use control measures to focus the operation on the desired end state. Commanders direct operations by: preparing and approving plans and orders; assigning and adjusting tasks, task organization, and control measures based on changing conditions; positioning units to maximize combat power, anticipate actions, or create or preserve options; positioning key leaders at critical times and places; allocating resources based on opportunities and threats; accepting prudent risk; committing the reserve; changing priorities of support." Ibid., 2-4. 81 Smith, Coral and Brass, 168-169. 82 Love, "Smith versus Smith," 5. 
Staff Unity of Effort?
Confusion regarding operations along Nafutan Point continued throughout the following day.
After his meeting with Lieutenant General Holland Smith, the 27th Infantry Division commander next met with Brigadier General Erskine. This meeting occurred shortly after 1600 on 22 June. Brigadier General Erskine detailed the day's events over an operational map with the division commander. 94 The
Corps' attack north was going well, but the 4th Marine Division was wearing down. 95 The Marine division had taken heavy causalities during the amphibious assault as well as during its stiff fight at Hill 98 The Kagman Peninsula is located near the center of the island and to the east of Mount Tapotchau, the highest location on Saipan. Kagman Peninsula forms the northern side of Magicienne Bay, also located on the eastern side of the island, with Nafutan Point forming the southern side of the bay.
99 Northern Troop Landing Force, "Operation Order 10-44," 2200 22 June 1944, 1.
priority and that consolidating the Corps' combat power north was critical to securing the island.
Brigadier General Erskine suggested that if one infantry battalion was insufficient to clear Nafutan Point, then the enemy there could be contained and a larger clearing force would be sent back south after operations to the north were completed. 104 The difficulty with this approach was the fact that one infantry battalion would be assigned to cover a frontage of three thousand yards containing a strongly entrenched enemy force in impassable terrain. 105 The risk was too great for Ralph Smith to accept at Nafutan Point, so he wrote the letter requesting Holland Smith to place the air and services personnel near Aslito Airfield on full alert. 106 This grave warning from the division commander would be a harbinger of things to come after Ralph Smith was relieved of his command and the enemy infiltrated 105th Infantry's defense, attacked units at the airfield, and caused several dozen American causalities.
107
The division operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frederic Sheldon, began drafting a division order for the next day's attack north. This was a change in the orders process since landing on Saipan because the division had just issued verbal orders up to this point in time. Lieutenant Colonel Sheldon was crafting the division orders based on the draft V Corps orders that his boss received after his meeting with Brigadier General Erskine. This division order, number 45A, was finally sent to the regimental headquarters by courier at 2100 on the evening of 22 June. 108 A copy was also sent to 2d Battalion, 105th
Infantry, which was the lone infantry battalion responsible for continuing the clearing operations at Nafutan Point. In the division orders to the 2d Battalion, the infantry battalion was instructed to report directly to the V Corps once the remaining enemy forces at Nafutan Point were cleared. 109 The division's orders to the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry were quoted directly from the draft V Corps orders that were 104 General Smith about the change in orders and sent a courier to 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry's command post to notify its commander of the change. However, the battalion commander was not notified of the change until after sunrise on 23 June, and the battalion did not begin clearing operations until 1300.
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Given the multiple relief-in-place tasks the battalion had to complete during the night, it is purely speculative to believe the battalion could have begun operations at dawn as the V Corps orders directed.
The delay in the 2d Battalion's attack did not adversely affect Holland Smith's operational plans for 23
June and did not provide sufficient grounds for justifying Ralph Smith's relief.
The 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry was now responsible for a front line that was previously defended by four infantry battalions less than 48 hours earlier. 114 The task of reorganizing the battalion's new massive front was certainly time consuming and could not be effectively accomplished under the cover of darkness. Holland Smith's inability to effectively communicate his understanding and vision to 110 Love, "Smith versus Smith," 7.
111 Headquarters Expeditionary Troops Task Force 56, "G-3 Periodic Report No 9," Report On Operation FORAGER Volume D (23 June 1944), 2. 112 Sherrod, "The Saipan Controversy," 17.
effectively employ the 27th Infantry Division is manifested again just hours before Ralph Smith's relief.
The V Corps chief of staff did not understand Holland Smith's vision or direction for operations at Nafutan Point, and neither did the V Corps operations officer in writing the mission orders. Holland
Smith and his V Corps staff failed to effectively communicate how the V Corps commander understood, visualized, described, or directed his operational end-state or mission orders to Ralph Smith's 27th
Infantry Division. Unfortunately, Ralph Smith's relief was not the only casualty resulting from this lack of V Corps mission command capability.
Leadership Assessment
Commanders at all levels must be the embodiment of effective leadership qualities and traits; if not, their unit will fail. Whether in today's operational environment or during Second World War's Pacific Island campaigns, a commander's leadership skill often means the difference between success and failure. The commander provides his subordinate leaders the purpose, direction, and motivation throughout the unit's operations. It is through leadership that a commander ensures that his subordinates understand the purpose of the operation, directs how to employ the resources allocated, and instills the motivation to accomplish the mission with the combat power allocated.
The Army's Operations doctrine defines leadership "as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. An Army leader, by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals." 115 By applying leadership through the warfighting functions, commanders can intensify and unify the elements of combat power towards the accomplishment of the unit's objectives. Operations expands on these principles by stating, a "confident, competent, and informed leadership intensifies the effectiveness of all other elements of combat power by formulating sound operational ideas and assuring discipline and motivation in the force." 116 Effective leadership can overcome deficiencies in other warfighting capabilities, but ineffective or poor leadership can negate relative advantages in combat power. One of Holland Smith's justifications for the relief was that Ralph Smith was failing to lead his division and engage the enemy. The leadership assessment section of this monograph will demonstrate how Ralph Smith provided purpose, direction, and motivation to his division; however, Holland Smith failed to recognize or accept Ralph Smith's leadership skills, and therefore relieved him for ineffective leadership in combat.
Fighting for Nafutan Point
Ralph Smith ensured his subordinate commanders understood the purpose 117 of their orders throughout the battle for Saipan. This was particularly the case when the division shifted north leaving the 105th Infantry to fight on Nafutan Point. In Major General Smith's orders issued at 2000 on 21 June to his regimental commander, Colonel Leonard Bishop, the division commander did order the colonel to hold his frontline with two battalions and keep one battalion in reserve. The division commander also instructed the 105th Infantry to relieve all elements of the 165th Infantry, then on the frontline, no later than 0600 on 22 June. 118 Then after conducting the relief in place, Colonel Bishop was to immediately resume offensive operations to clear the remaining enemy on Nafutan Point, thus preventing the Japanese from interfering with the V Corps' main assault. The division commander's orders stated that offensive operations were to commence no later than 1100 on 22 June. 119 Colonel Bishop clearly understood the purpose of his regiment was to seal the remaining enemy forces on Nafutan Point and to ensure his soldiers were properly positioned after conducting the relief in place in order to continue clearing operations on the following morning.
The next day, Major General Ralph Smith met briefly with Lieutenant General Holland Smith after the V Corps commander's regular afternoon staff meeting on 22 June to discuss the situation at Nafutan Point. Holland Smith expressed some concerns to Ralph Smith regarding the timeliness and effectiveness of the clearing operations at the southeastern peninsula. 120 Holland Smith was specifically concerned with reports that Colonel Bishop was not aggressively pursuing the enemy but rather isolating the Japanese with the intent to "starve them out if necessary." 121 This slow and deliberate approach by the 105 th Infantry commander was not one of Holland Smith's preferred tactics. 122 The Marine general was known for faster paced operations that were often classified as more costly methods of dealing with enemy resistance. 123 Several other Army generals who had also served under the V Corps commander officially renounced Lieutenant General Smith's high level of risk acceptance for decisive action.
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Major General Smith stated that if this was indeed the case, Colonel Bishop was not taking the proper approach to the situation on Nafutan Point and that the Army division commander would take the necessary actions to correct this problem. Colonel Bishop later testified that he made no statement to anyone from the V Corps staff regarding a "starve them out" approach to clearing the enemy from Nafutan Point. 125 Similar to the lack of military intelligence analysis, the V Corps staff was inaccurately assessing the 27th Infantry Division's actions. 126 The commander of the 105th Infantry clearly understood directed scheme of maneuver, also in accordance with V Corps' concept of operations for the 27th
Infantry Division.
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Aside from discussing the situation regarding the 105th Infantry, the meeting on the afternoon of 22 June between the two Smiths was light and uneventful. 128 No other issues or concerns were discussed between the two generals. There was no argument regarding Nafutan Point, and the matter concerning adjusting Colonel Bishop's tactical approach was amicably agreed to by the end of the meeting. 129 This would be the last face-to-face meeting between the two Smiths. Herein lies a crucial difference between the two generals. Up to this point, Holland Smith was relying on his staff for battlefield reports and key staff members to communicate his vision and direction for the invasion. Ralph Smith's leadership style was to directly yet tactfully confront his commander regarding any operational or tactical concerns during the battle for Saipan. The Army general utilized a similar approach with his subordinate commanders. He directly confronted his regimental commanders to ensure they understood the purpose of their mission orders, and he held them accountable for the execution of the division's orders.
Leaders Recon into Death Valley
On the morning of 22 June, the bulk of the 27th Infantry Division moved into an assembly area on the northern side of Aslito Airfield as the V Corps reserve. From its assembly area the division was in a position to respond quickly to either 2d or 4th Marine Divisions currently engaged with the Japanese forces to the north of the airfield. Major General Smith, accompanied by his operations officer and an observer from the War Department, departed the assembly area to coordinate with the two forward Marine Divisions. 130 The 27th Infantry Division commander received current situation reports and 127 Shaw, Nalty, Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, 308. 128 Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, 150. 137 There was some discussion as to whether the division could meet this aggressive 131 Love, "Smith versus Smith," 6.
132 "Providing clear direction involves communicating how to accomplish a mission: prioritizing tasks, assigning responsibility for completion, and ensuring subordinates understand the standard. Although subordinates want and need direction, they expect challenging tasks, quality training, and adequate resources. They should be given appropriate freedom of action. Providing clear direction allows followers the freedom to modify plans and orders to adapt to changing circumstances. Directing while adapting to change is a continuous process." U.S. Army, Leadership, [1] [2] 133 "Vision is another way that leaders can provide purpose. Vision refers to an organizational purpose that may be broader or have less immediate consequences than other purpose statements. Higherlevel leaders carefully consider how to communicate their vision." Ibid. 134 Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, 150-51. 135 Love, " Smith versus Smith, " 7. 136 Mount Tapotchau is 1554 feet tall, and it is the most dominate piece of key terrain on the island. Rottman, Saipan and Tinian 1944, 10. 137 Venzon, From Whaleboats to Amphibious Warfare, 106. timeline, but no major issue was made of it other than for the division commander to keep the corps headquarters apprised of its movement throughout the next morning.
Upon his return to the division headquarters, Major General Smith spent thirty minutes with his regimental commanders. The division commander reviewed his notes from his earlier meetings at corps headquarters, particularly his notes from his meeting with Brigadier General Erskine. After a careful map study with his commanders, the division commander assigned the left sector of the division's area of operation to the 106th Infantry and assigned the right sector to the 165th Infantry. 138 The regimental commanders were familiar with the road network approaches within their assigned sectors since both commanders had conducted route reconnaissance days earlier as part of their current mission as the reserve for the two Marine divisions. 139 At the conclusion of the division order's brief, both regimental commanders returned to their respective command posts to confer with their battalion commanders. The division was set to begin its three mile movement north at 0530, 23 June. 140 Ralph Smith provided the detailed direction and purpose to his commanders regarding the division's attack north into Death Valley.
Spurring action in Death Valley
After fighting for twenty-four hours in Death Valley, a telegram arrived from the V Corps commander expressing his frustration with the Army division's lack of movement north and inability to come alongside the two Marine divisions. Ralph Smith decided to personally assess the fighting spirit of his soldiers and motivate 141 his division into action. Major General Ralph Smith and his assistant division commander, Brigadier General Ogden J. Ross, departed the division command post for the front lines. 138 Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, 151. 139 Love, "Smith versus Smith," 7.
140 Shaw, Nalty, Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, 311. 141 "Motivation supplies the will to do what is necessary to accomplish a mission. Motivation comes from within, but is affected by others' actions and words. A leader's role in motivation is to understand the needs and desires of others, to align and elevate individual drives into team goals, and to influence others and accomplish those larger aims. Some people have high levels of internal motivation to get a job done, while others need more reassurance and feedback. Motivation spurs initiative when something needs to be accomplished." U.S. Army, Leadership, 1-2.
The two generals surveyed each company's position and observed their men fighting against the heavy Japanese resistance.
142 By noon, the division commander devised a plan to maneuver his forces in an effort to flank the Japanese stronghold, and he began briefing his regimental commanders. In Holland Smith's justification to Admiral Spruance, he stated that Ralph Smith had contravened his orders regarding the 105th Infantry. 169 According to Holland Smith, the 105th Infantry had been removed from Ralph Smith's command authority, and the regiment was then under the direct operational control of 165 Gailey, Howlin' Mad vs The Army, 167-171. 166 Love, "Smith versus Smith," 9. 167 Turner, " The flawed military intelligence assessment of the enemy's strengths and capabilities at Nafutan Point as well as in Death Valley, the unclear operational orders in the midst of battlefield friction, and the perceived ineffective leadership abilities of Ralph Smith all contributed to Holland Smith's justification for relieving the Army division commander. In viewing the relief through the elements of today's combat power application, Holland Smith's decision appears premature and the justifications that Ralph Smith disregarded orders and lacked leadership are not fully substantiated.
